A.
EOCC Scope
1.
Due to the large number of possible equipment combinations and steaming
conditions that could exist when a casualty occurs and the effects these would
have on the response to the casualty, the EOCC is written for an assumed plant
condition with associated effects on plant operations. These standard assumptions are found in the
EOSS User's Guide for each ship class.
Examples are given below for normal plant configurations for different
representative classes of ships.
a)
For One-Shaft Ships:
(1)
The ship is proceeding underway at standard speed.
(2)
Steaming One Boiler.
(3)
Operating Two Turbine Generators.
(4)
Electrical Plant is in Parallel.
b)
For Two-Shaft Ships:
(1)
The ship is proceeding underway at standard speed
.
(2)
Steaming One Boiler in each Plant.
(3)
Operating One Turbine Generator in each Plant.
(4)
Steam Plant is Split: Electrical Plant is in Parallel.
c)
For Four-Shaft Ships:
(1)
The ship is proceeding underway at standard speed.
(2)
Number of Steaming Boilers dependent on ships configuration.
(3)
Number of Turbine Generators dependent on ships configuration.
(4)
Electrical Plant is Split.
B.
Types of
EOCC Documentation
1.
The EOCC consists of four types of documentation. The types of
documentation and their uses are as follows:
a)
Casualty Response Procedure (WATCH AREA). This document provides all the
actions that must be taken at a particular watch area when responding to a
given plant casualty. In most cases, a
separate casualty response procedure is provided for each plant casualty
covered by EOCC. The exceptions to this
are:
(1)
When a particular watch area is not affected by the plant casualty
(e.g., the Boiler Technician (BT's watch areas are not normally affected by the
Machinist mate (MM) casualties such as a hot main engine bearing).
(2)
When the same stations are taken by a watch area for several different
plant casualties (e.g., the MM's use the same casualty response procedures for
Loss of Main Steam Pressure, LMSP for most of the BT casualties).
b)
This document also includes the watch communications that are necessary
for responding to the particular plant casualty.
c)
Master Casualty Response Procedures.
This document contains all the watch area actions throughout the plant
for responding to a given plant casualty.
It also includes the symptoms and indications for recognizing the
casualty, the possible causes of the casualty and the possible effects of the
watch area EOCC. Communications are
included in this document exactly as they appear in the individual watch area
casualty response procedure with one exception. Reports from the watchstanders to the top watch are summarized in
the master casualty response procedure as steps to "ensure" that the
appropriate action has been taken. Since most actions taken in response to a
casualty occur simultaneously throughout the plant, the steps included in the
master casualty response procedures are not in sequence. The steps are, however, presented in the
best possible sequence to provide each watchstander with an understanding of
the total plant casualty response and his or role in that response. With the exception of emergency plant
evolutions the master casualty response is not used for responding to a
casualty response.
d)
Emergency Plant Evolutions include class bravo Fire, Major Flooding, and
Major Steam Leak/Rupture and are covered differently in the EOCC than a plant
casualty. A plant casualty involves a
specific piece of equipment or system; therefore, the effect of the casualty on
the plant and the actions required to control and isolate the casualty can be
specifically defined. An emergency plant evolution, however, can occur anywhere
in the plant. Therefore, the effect of
the emergency on the plant and the actions required to control and isolate the
emergency cannot be specifically defined. Because of this, watch area casualty
response procedures for the emergency plant evolutions are not included in
EOCC; only the master casualty response procedure is provided.
C.
Recognizing
a Possible Casualty:
The Master Casualty
Response Procedure includes the symptoms and indications for recognizing the
casualty. By recognizing a possible
casualty in its early stages, an alert watchstander can take or initiate action
to prevent the casualty from occurring.
It is for this reason that every watchstander must memorize the symptoms
and indications, possible effects, for every casualty.
D.
Each EOCC
document consists of four basic sections. These sections and their uses are
described as follows:
1.
CONTROLLING ACTIONS: Controlling
Actions are those watch actions that are taken to prevent a possible casualty
from becoming an actual casualty. Where
there are no controlling actions for a casualty the word "NONE" will
appear in the Controlling Actions section.
This section of the casualty response procedure will also define the
conditions for proceeding to the Immediate Actions section. Controlling actions will continue until the
conditions for proceeding to Immediate Actions occur or until the cause of the
malfunction has been corrected and the equipment returned to normal
operation. The actions included in this
section must be memorized.
2.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS: Immediate
Actions are those watch area actions that are taken to stop the spread of the
casualty and minimize plant losses. The
taking of Immediate Actions must be ordered by the top watch responsible for
the malfunctioning equipment. Coordination of Immediate Actions is not
required. Each watchstander performs
the Immediate Actions for his or her watch area as quickly as possible and
reports back to his immediate supervisor when they have been completed. When the order to proceed to Immediate
Actions has been completed. When the order to proceed to Immediate Actions has
been given, it must be reported to the EOOW immediately so that the Immediate Actions
in other spaces can be taken. Certain
component procedures (CPs) include sections for securing the component during a
casualty. These sections are Immediate
Actions and along with the Immediate Actions contained in the casualty response
procedures must be memorized.
3.
SUPPLEMENTARY ACTIONS:
Supplementary Actions are those watch area actions that are taken to
bring the plant to a safe and stable operating condition. Some actions in this section must be coordinated
between watch areas and engineering spaces.
Where coordination is required, communications are included in the
casualty response procedure. The
actions in this section do not have to be memorized. When all Immediate Actions have been taken, the watchstanders
should refer to the written documents for the particular casualty, review the
Immediate Actions to ensure all required actions have been taken and proceed
with the Supplementary Actions. Once
all Supplementary Actions have been completed and the plant is in a safe and
stable operating condition, the extent of the damage can be determined and a
decision made to either restore the plant to operation or continue to secure
the affected equipment.
4.
RESTORATION: The restoration section refers to the proper EOP procedures
to be used for:
a)
Restoring the plant to operation.
b)
Continuing with securing of the affected equipment.
c)
When the affected equipment can be restored to operation, the hot
light-off procedures included in the EOP are used. These include all the types of EOP documentation (O, S and CPs)
as well as the "STARTING AFTER A CASUALTY" sections of certain
component procedures (CPs). When the
affected equipment cannot be restored to operation, the "normal"
securing procedures included in the EOP are used.
E.
Restricted
Maneuvering:
The EOCC casualty
response procedures are written for use in the general watchstanding situation
where every effort should be taken to minimize the damage to the main
propulsion plant. There are times when
the ship will be in certain restricted maneuvering conditions where the
Commanding Officer may wish to personally make the decision to adhere to or
vary from the written procedures because of danger to the ship. The Commanding Officer shall establish a
written policy concerning specific casualties/actions which will require a personal
command decision.
F.
Communications
in Eoss
1.
The types of communications that are included as steps or parts of steps
in EOP and EOCC are as follows:
a)
Communications in EOP
(1)
OOD orders the EOOW.
(2)
EOOW reports to the OOD.
(3)
EOOW request permission from the OOD.
(4)
OOD grants permission to the EOOW.
(5)
Top watch request permission from the EOOW.
(6)
EOOW grants permission to top watch.
(7)
EOOW orders top watch.
(8)
Top watch reports to the EOOW.
(9)
Top watch orders watchstanders.
(10)
Watchstanders report to the Top watch.
(11)
In some cases, EOOW orders watchstanders.
(12)
When ordered by the EOOW, watchstanders report to the EOOW.
b)
Communications in EOOC
(1)
Top watch notifies EOOW.
(2)
EOOW notifies OOD and Top watch.
(3)
Top watch orders watchstanders.
(4)
Top watch reports to the EOOW.
(5)
Watchstanders report to the Top watch.
(6)
EOOW orders Top watch.
(7)
EOOW reports to the OOD.
2.
Not all of the above communications will necessarily be included in
EOSS. Only those communications that
are required for the EOOW and the Top watch to make decisions and conduct a
safe, orderly and controlled plant evolution are included in EOSS as steps or
parts of steps. The absence of routine
communication steps in EOSS does not mean that they should be ignored, they
have been omitted from EOSS to keep the documentation from becoming too long
and ineffective.
G.
In order to
ensure effective communications, the following rules should be followed:
1.
Watchstanders report only to the Top watch
2.
Top watch reports only to the EOOW.
3.
The EOOW reports only to the OOD.
4.
The OOD orders only the EOOW.
5.
The EOOW orders only the Top watch.
6.
The Top watch orders only the watchstanders under his or her
supervision.
7.
All orders and reports must be acknowledged by repeating back the order
or report to the originator.
8.
When an action is ordered, a report must be made when the action is
completed. Some additional
communications guidance is as follows:
a)
Keep communications brief.
b)
Always use valve numbers to designate individual valves.
c)
When reporting completed actions, be specific in identifying equipment
started/stopped, valves opened/shut, etc.
H.
Loss of
Main Feed Control (LMFC)
1.
Symptoms & Indications:
a)
Unable to maintain proper water level in boilers.
b)
Hunting of feed pressure or feedwater controls.
c)
Main feed pumps trips or overspeeds.
d) Water level alarm sounds ( +7, -6 inches
).
2.
Causes:
a)
A loss of control air.
b)
Failure of automatic feedwater control component (s).
c)
Contamination of control air supply.
d)
Failure of main feed pump, main feed booster pump, or deaerating feed
tank.
3.
Effects:
a)
Loss of boiler.
b)
Loss of main steam pressure.
4.
Controlling Actions:
a)
Shifting feedwater control from automatic to remote manual control if
time permits (if water level cannot be maintained in remote manual, shift to
local manual control if time permits).
b)
Check system components as time permits.
(1)
Feedwater control valve.
(2)
3 Element feed system.
(3).
Main feed pump governor control.
(4)
Main feed booster pump.
c)
When feedwater control cannot be restored or remote water level alarm
sounds, proceed to immediate actions.
Note: Do not confuse the high
and low water level alarms with a high or low water casualty. The casualty is still designated as a
"Loss of main feed control". As long as there is water in the boiler
gage glass.
5.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Report casualty to the OOD.
b)
Secure boiler fuel, feed, main/auxiliary stops.
c)
Crack superheater protection bleeder, bleed boiler pressure down till
boiler stops generating.
d)
Shut all air registers.
e)
Secure engine throttle.
f)
Secure SSTG's.
CAUTION:
Do not operate the main feed booster pump on cold suction unless securing the boiler.
NOTE: If water level drops out of sight while
fires are still lit, proceed to immediate
actions for low water casualty.
6.
Supplementary Actions: Properly
secure the plant IAW EOP.
7.
Restoring Actions:
a)
Repair damage as necessary.
b)
Establish feedwater control.
c)
Purge IAW purge tables.
d)
Relight fires.
NOTE: When a boiler is
secured for a casualty, it is secured by the fastest means possible.
e)
Fuel is secured with the fuel oil quick closing valve.
f)
Feedwater with the automatic feed check
valve in remote manual (The manual feed check valve is secured as a backup
action)
g)
And the main and auxiliary steam stops are closed with the air motor
closures (If installed).
h)
This is a "Rule of thumb" procedure for which there are
exceptions.
i)
A through knowledge of EOCC procedures is
therefore required to preclude a situation such as a low water casualty, where
the boiler would suffer severe damage if not secured by the "Rule of
thumb" procedure.
I.
Low Boiler
Water Level (LBWL)
1.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Increase in feedwater control signal.
b)
Decrease in combustion control signal.
c)
Remote water level alarm sounds (Alarm setting -6 inches).
d)
Unusual drop in steam pressure.
e)
Water drops out of sight in boiler gage glass while fires are still lit.
The boiler is said to have a "Low water casualty". Prior to this event the boiler has
experienced a "Loss of main feed control" casualty.
2.
Causes:
a)
Loss of main feed control/pressure.
b)
Failure of main feed pump or main feed booster pump.
c)
low water in the DFT.
d)
Ruptured main feed system piping, ruptured DFT.
3.
Effects:
a)
Loss of main steam pressure.
b)
Loss of ship mobility and power.
c)
Loss of boiler (48-72 hours out of commission).
d)
Possible boiler damage.
e)
Ruptured boiler tube.
f)
Warpage of boiler tubes.
g)
Marriage of boiler tubes.
h)
Distortion of pressure parts.
i)
Brickwork failure.
j)
Warpage of boiler casing.
4.
Controlling Actions:
NOTE: Controlling actions are taken during a
loss of feedwater control casualty. When the remote water level alarm sounds,
proceed to immediate actions.
5. Immediate Actions:
a)
Report casualty to the OOD.
b)
Secure boiler fuel (use fuel oil quick closing valve), feed,
main/auxiliary stops.
c)
Lift safety valves by hand, hence saturation temperature is lowered
preventing subsequent swell and chill shocking of exposed tube area. The annealing, which is the gradual cooling
process is allowed to occur preventing tube damage. NOTE: Safety valves are lifted only if water level drops out of
sight with fires lit.
d)
Shut main engine throttle.
e)
Secure SSTG's.
CAUTION:
When boiler is secured due to low water it is essential that no attempt is made to restore water level. Attempts to restore water level will result in severe damage to
the boiler.
6. Supplementary Actions: Properly secure
the plant IAW EOP.
7. Restoring Actions:
a)
If water level dropped out of sight with fires lit:
(1)
The boiler is out of commission.
(2)
Allow boiler to cool to ambient temperature (48-72 hours), open for
inspection of the fire side surfaces, repair as necessary.
b)
If the boiler was secured before water level dropped out of sight (Loss
of main feed control):
(1)
Determine cause of the casualty, repair or correct cause of casualty.
(2)
Purge IAW purge tables.
(3)
Reestablish water level control.
(4)
Relight fires.
NOTE:
The inspection criteria for low water in a boiler is dependent upon whether or not fires were lit when
water level dropped out of
sight. If fires were lit, we cannot be
sure if tubes were uncovered
before the boiler firing was secured.
Such being the case, the
boiler must be inspected for damage. If
there was visible water in the gage
glass when fires were secured, we
know that the boiler tubes were protected. Should water level drop out of sight after fires are secured, there is no
cause for alarm. Boiler firing has secured, but the boiler
will continue to generate steam which
could lower the water level in the
steam drum. Since the tubes were not exposed to the direct flame in the furnace in a dry or partially dry state,
there will be no metal damage due to
uneven heating
J.
High Boiler
Water Level (HBWL)
1. Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Decrease in feedwater control signal.
b)
Remote water level alarm sounds (Alarm setting +7 inches).
c)
Water rises out of sight in boiler gage glass.
d)
Priming.
e)
Sudden decrease in superheater outlet temperature.
f)
Steam leaks at flanges, seals, packing
glands.
g)
Rumbling/Vibration in steam piping.
NOTE: As in the case with a low water casualty,
the boiler does not experience a
high water casualty until the water is out of sight high in the boiler gage glass
2.
Causes:
a)
Loss of feedwater control.
b)
Failure of automatic component/s in the feed system.
c)
Loss of control air.
d)
Inattention of personnel.
3.
Effects:
a)
Water carryover damage to main turbines, SSTGs, Main Feed Pumps
b)
Damage/contamination of boiler superheater.
c)
Loss of boiler damage to steam line gaskets, packing, seal rings.
4.
Controlling Actions: NONE. Controlling actions are taken during a loss
of feedwater control casualty. When the
remote water level alarm sounds, proceed to immediate actions.
5.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Report casualty to the OOD.
b)
Secure boiler, fuel (use fuel oil quick closing valves), feed,
main/auxiliary steam stops, shut all air registers.
c)
Open superheater protection bleeder valve, slowly bleed boiler pressure
down till boiler stops generating
.
d)
Crack open superheater intermediate and inlet/outlet header drains to
the bilge, check for condensate.
e)
Shut main engine throttle.
f)
Secure SSTG's.
g)
Stop Main Feed Pumps.
h)
Crack drain valves on all affected steam lines, check for condensate.
6.
Supplementary Actions: Secure
the boiler and plant IAW EOP.
7.
Restoring Actions:
a)
Surface blow to regain water level.
b)
Check and record Rotor Position Indicators.
c)
Repair damage as necessary.
d)
Establish water level.
e)
Control purge IAW purge tables.
f)
Relight fires.
g)
Shift, inspect, and clean lube oil strainers on all main steam turbine
driven machinery.
h)
Main Engines.
i)
SSTG's.
j)
Main Feed Pumps.
NOTE:
Inspect strainer baskets for babbitt, check strainer magnets for ferrous materials. Shift main Engine lube oil strainers at each major bell change when returning to ordered speed.
NOTE:
A situation could arise where the watchstanders are unsure of the direction the water level went in the
boiler. This casualty is referred to as a "water out of sight"
casualty. For water out of sight, each
space assumes the worst possible
case. The fireroom takes action for a
low water casualty while the Engineroom
takes action for a high water casualty.
The casualty is identified by blowing down the boiler gage glass to determine if water out of
sight high or low.
K.
Ruptured
Boiler Tube
1.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Sudden increase in combustion control signal.
b)
Difficulty in maintaining water level.
c)
Inability to maintain boiler water chemistry (leaking tube).
d)
Excessive use of make up feedwater (leaking tube).
e)
Unusual drop in steam pressure.
f)
Unusual noise in the firebox.
g)
Firebox fills with steam.
h)
Steam issuing from the stack.
2.
Causes:
a)
Low water
.
b)
Improper water chemistry.
c)
Tube erosion.
d)
Fouled watersides.
e)
Fouled firesides.
f)
Excessive corrosion.
g)
Excessive firing rate.
3.
Effects:
a)
Loss of boiler.
b)
Damage to adjacent tubes.
c)
Brickwork failure.
d)
Loss of main steam pressure.
e)
Loss of ship mobility and power.
4.
Controlling Actions: If the
rupture is not major, secure the boiler and continue to feed the boiler
maintaining water level until boiler has cooled. If major a rupture occurs, proceed to immediate actions.
5.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Report casualty to the OOD.
b)
Evacuate personnel immediately for a major rupture (BTOW Decision).
c)
Secure boiler (From Topside If Necessary): Fuel (Use Fuel Oil Quick
Closing Valve), Secure fuel oil service pump if Topside, Feed, Main/Auxiliary
stops.
d)
Open all air registers.
e)
Use electric forced draft blower or natural draft to evacuate steam from
the firebox.
f)
Lift safeties by hand to Zero PSI.
g)
Shut main Engine throttle.
h)
Secure SSTG's.
i)
Boiler is OOC until repairs can be made.
6.
Supplementary Actions: Secure
plant IAW EOP.
7.
Restoring Actions:
a)
Light off standby boiler.
b)
Lay up affected boiler by best means possible.
c)
Repair if possible (Plug affected tube).
d)
Hydro affected boiler: If boiler passes 100 % hydro, boiler can be
placed back in commission.
L.
Loss of
Boiler Fires (LOBF)
1.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Fires die out.
b)
Excessive accumulation of slag of firesides (Prolonged period).
c)
Boiler fires unstable/sputtering.
d)
Fuel oil service pump stops
e)
Rapid drop in steam pressure.
f)
Flareback.
g)
White smoke.
2.
Causes:
a)
Improper stripping/testing of fuel oil prior to use.
b)
Loss of fuel oil service pump.
c)
Insufficient quality of steam used for atomization.
d)
Loss of fuel oil suction.
3.
Effects:
a)
Loss of boiler.
b)
Damage to fuel oil service pump.
c)
Flareback.
d)
Boiler Explosion.
4.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Report casualty to the OOD.
b)
Secure boiler: Fuel (use fuel
oil quick closing valve), feed main / auxiliary steam stops, shut all air
registers.
NOTE: If residual fires are present, leave one
open and allow fires to burn out.
c)
Open the superheater protection bleeder valve, slowly bleed boiler
pressure down till boiler stops generating.
d)
Inspect the furnace floor for any residual fires or accumulation of
unburned fuel before purging, report results to the EOOW. If unburned fuel on furnace floor is
present: Align steam smothering when
casing is full of steam (5 Min.), open the two lower registers, allow firebox
and smokepipe to fill with steam for 30 minutes. Purge firebox and shut all air
registers.
e)
Allow boiler to cool to ambient temperature.
f)
Prior to entry and clean up, position the
three way valve to the contaminated tank, start the affected fuel oil service
pump with suction on the standby tank(If water in the fuel). Start the standby FOSP (If cause was
FOSP). Recirc fuel to the contaminated
tank until a good sample is obtained.
Shift fuel oil service pumps if required.
5.
Supplementary Actions: Secure
plant IAW EOP.
6.
Restoring Actions:
a)
Determine the source of the contamination.
b)
Make repairs as necessary.
c)
Purge IAW the purge tables.
d)
Relight fires.
M.
White
Smoke (WS)
1.
Situation: Unburned fuel in an aerosol state is present in the boiler
firebox and stacks.
2.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Boiler fires unstable/Sputtering.
b)
Orange glow or a blacked out smoke periscope (verify smoke condition
with the bridge.
NOTE:
If a Wager photo electric smoke indicator is installed, the orange glow will not be observed due to the installed blue filter.
c)
Possible high superheater outlet temperature (Excess Air).
d)
Low stack gas temperature
(Extreme Excess Air).
3.
Causes:
a)
Insufficient quality steam for atomization (i.e temperature is either
below 3700 F, pressure is below 135 psi, or a combination of the
two).
b)
Improper fuel/air ratio.
NOTE: As much as 300 %
Excess air must be present to smoke white.
c)
Failure of a component in the air loop of the ACC system.
4.
Effects:
a)
Boiler explosion.
b)
Damage to fittings, brickwork, smoke pipe, and/or pressure parts.
c)
Injury to operating personnel.
d)
Loss of the boiler.
5.
Controlling Actions:
a)
If a failure of an automatic combustion control system component is
identified as the cause of the white smoke, attempt to correct the situation by
shifting automatic combustion control system from automatic to remote manual
placing fuel in remote manual first.
NOTE:
It is extremely important that fuel oil pressure not be manipulated,
that is why it is placed in remote
manual first. If it were not and the operator were to adjust the air first, the
fuel oil would follow the air. This would cause the condition to become even
more dangerous.
b)
Place the forced draft blowers in remote manual control and adjust the
blower speeds.
CAUTION: if the white smoke condition persists for
more than one minute after the
white smoke condition started or if the white smoke is extremely heavy, the boiler must be secured. If you do not know when the white smoke condition started, secure the boiler. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO INCREASE FUEL OIL HEADER PRESSURE
AS A MEANS TO CLEAR WHITE SMOKE.
6.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Secure the boiler: Fuel (use the
quick closing valve), Feed, Main steam stop
NOTE: Leave the auxiliary steam stop open to
operate the steam forced draft blower.
b)
Open all the air registers and continue to operate the forced draft
blower until all traces of white smoke are gone (monitor stack).
c)
Visually inspect furnace floor for accumulations of unburned fuel or
furnace floor fire.
d)
If fire on the furnace floor is present.
e)
Leave one lower air register open.
f)
Secure the F.D.B. and allow the fire to burn
itself out via natural ventilation.
g)
If unburned fuel on the furnace floor is present:
h)
Secure the forced draft blowers.
i)
Secure all air registers & admit steam
smothering to the boiler casing, when the casing is full of steam, open the two
lower air registers and allow firebox and smokepipe to fill steam for thirty
minutes. After 30 minutes secure the
steam smothering system, purge the firebox then shut all air registers.
j)
Allow boiler to cool to ambient temperature
before entering the firebox to clean out fuel accumulation.
7.
Supplementary Actions: Secure
plant IAW EOP.
8.
Restoring Actions:
a)
Repair/correct the cause of the white smoke.
b)
Inspect boiler for damage
c)
Clean fuel from the furnace floor as necessary.
d)
Purge IAW the purge tables.
e)
Relight fires/light fires in the standby boiler.
N.
Heavy Black
Smoke (HBS)
1.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Periscope totally obscured by smoke: smoke severity does not decrease
upon attempts to correct the combustion air flow levels
b)
Sputtering , unusual heavy black smoke or erratic flame pattern.
c)
Topside observer reports heavy black smoke.
d)
Flame appearance is unusual, particularly showing a streaked appearance
e)
Smoke is pouring from the light off port, idle burners, or other casing
joints.
f)
The smoke condition occurs suddenly, when it
was previously satisfactory.
g)
The burner flame, or raw oil, appears to be coming back into the casing.
h)
A floor fire exist on the furnace deck.
2.
Possible Causes:
a)
Atomizer oil leakage.
b)
Failure of atomizer parts.
c)
Very poor boiler draft during light off.
d)
Extremely deficient combustion air flow.
3.
Possible Effects:
a)
Loss of boiler and steam pressure.
b)
Boiler explosion.
4.
Controlling Actions:
NOTE: If unable to correct the heavy black smoke
condition within two minutes of its detection,
proceed to immediate actions.
a)
Shift fuel oil and blowers to remote manual and increase air flow or
decrease fuel flow to obtain a clear stack.
b)
Check burner flame patterns. If
required, BTOW order burners showing signs of improper combustion secured.
c)
Check for fire on furnace floor or for raw fuel or fire coming back into
the air casing.
5.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Report casualty to the OOD.
b)
Secure boiler: Fuel, Feed, Main/Auxiliary steam, Shut all air registers.
NOTE: If fires are present leave one open and
allow fires to burn out.
c)
Open the superheater protection bleeder valve, slowly bleed pressure
till boiler stops generating.
d)
Inspect the furnace floor for any residual fires or accumulation of
unburned fuel before purging. Report results to the EOOW. If unburned fuel on furnace floor is
present, align steam smothering. When casing is full of steam (5 minutes), open
the two lower air registers. Allow
firebox and smokepipe to fill with steam for 30 minutes. Purge firebox and shut all air registers.
e)
Allow boiler to cool to ambient temperature.
6.
Supplementary Actions: Secure
Plant IAW EOP.
7.
Restoring Actions:
a)
Determine cause of casualty.
b)
Make repairs as necessary.
c)
Purge IAW purge tables.
d)
Relight fires.
O.
Loss of
Control Air (LCA)
1.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Control air pressure drops
b)
Control air pressure alarm sounds.
2.
Causes:
a)
Vital/Non vital air compressor or drive motor failure.
b)
Ruptured air line.
3.
Effects:
a)
Loss of automatic feedwater control.
b)
Loss of automatic combustion control.
c)
Pneumatic components fail to operate.
d)
Loss of boiler.
e)
Instability of auxiliary exhaust pressure.
f)
DFT flashes.
g)
Loss of Main Feed Pump.
h)
Loss of Main Feed Booster Pump.
i)
Loss of Main Engine.
j)
Loss of ships service turbine generator(s).
4.
Controlling Actions:
a)
Notify all spaces/OOD.
b)
Maintain ordered speed.
c)
Ensure standby LPAC started.
d)
Check system alignment.
e)
Secure non vital air system.
f)
Align HPAC augmenting station.
g)
When air lock position is reached by the ABC final control elements,
shift to local manual control.
h)
Maintain present speed.
i)
Shift remaining pneumatically controlled components
to local manual (see next page).
j)
If experiencing difficulty in safely
controlling the plant proceed to "Immediate Actions".
5.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Secure boiler / Plant IAW EOOC.
b)
Feed back on SSDG power.
6.
Supplementary and Restoring Actions:
IAW EOCC/EOP.
P.
Hot bearing
/ Uncontrollable Hot Bearing (HB / UHB)
1.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
Bearing L.O. outlet temperature exceeds normal parameters.
b)
Bearing L.O. outlet temperature exceeds 1800 F or a greater
than 500 F rise across the bearing (UHB).
c)
Bearing cover excessively hot to the touch
d)
Rapid rise in bearing temperature.
e)
Babbitt or foreign matter in L.O. strainer.
f)
Unusual noise/vibration.
g)
Bearing emitting smoke.
2.
Causes:
a)
Insufficient L.O. pressure to bearings.
b)
Obstructed bearing oil supply or return line.
c)
Grit or dirt in lube oil.
d)
Improperly fitted or aligned bearing.
e)
Poor condition of journal surface.
f)
Excessive gland seal leak off.
g)
Bearing oil film lost due to water in the L.O.
3.
Effects:
a)
Slowing Main Engine.
b)
Stopping & Locking shaft (UHB).
c)
Wiped bearings.
d)
Turbine/Reduction gear damage.
4.
Controlling actions:
a)
Set the bearing watch.
b)
Increase cooling water flow through L.O. cooler.
c)
Increase L.O. system pressure.
d)
Record rotor position indicators.
5.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Slow in standard speed increments.
b)
Notify OOD and all spaces.
c)
Deflect gland sealing steam.
d)
Rig artificial cooling.
e)
Ventilation.
f)
Wet rags to bearing cover/oil inlet piping.
g)
Increase L.O. pressure to the bearings.
h)
Stop & lock shaft (UHB).
6.
Supplementary Actions:
a)
Shift, inspect, clean L.O. strainers.
b)
Take lube oil sample.
c)
Take L.O. cooler water sample.
Q.
Loss of
Normal Electrical Power in conjunction with another casualty
1.
Symptoms / Indications:
a)
"Lights Out"
b) "Brown-Out" (Lighting begins
to dim)
2.
Causes:
a)
SSTG casualties.
b)
Boiler casualties.
c)
Switchboard casualties.
d)
Main space fire.
3.
Effects: Loss of normal source
electrical power initiates the auto start of the emergency diesel generator
supplying power to the emergency switchboard.
4.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Inform OOD/spaces of casualty.
b)
Restore firemain pressure.
c)
Restore operation of LPAC .
d)
Ensure all ABTs have shifted to emergency power source.
e)
Verify status of boiler fires and feed control if applicable.
f)
Verify status of Main Engine LOSPs, Main
Circ Pump, Main Condensate Pump.
g)
Continue with casualty control of initial casualty IAW EOOC.
CAUTION: Failure of EOOW to restore firemain or LP
air could lead to cascading
casualties.
5. Supplementary Actions: Depends on original plant status. Continue supplemental actions for the
initial casualty.
6. Restoring Actions: See EOOC for initial casualty.
R.
Main Space
Fire
1. Prevention:
a)
Properly stow and protect all combustibles.
b)
Make regular and frequent inspections.
c)
Educate personnel in the reduction of fire hazards.
d)
Enforce fire prevention policies and practices.
e)
Install and maintain flange shields on flammable liquid lines.
f)
Install and maintain proper covers on
flammable liquid strainers.
g)
Maintain lagging on all high temperature piping and machinery.
h)
Do not store flammable liquids in machinery spaces.
i)
Wipe up or remove any spilled, sprayed or
leaked fuel or lube oil.
j)
Deposit any contaminated fuel or lube oil in
the tanks designated for this purpose.
k)
Keep all ventilation ducts clean and free of oily residue.
l)
Keep bilges free of oil and oily waste.
2.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Secure the source of the oil.
b)
In the Fireroom the boiler is immediately secured for a fuel oil leak.
c)
In the Engineroom, if the leak is in the main lube oil system, stop and
lock the main engine shaft.
d)
For machinery such as SSTG's or pumps, trip the affected equipment.
e)
Report class bravo fire to the OOD giving location and source of the
fire, advise the OOD to sound general quarters.
f)
Fight the fire with installed fire fighting
system: Single agent system,
halon, or CO2 flooding
system.
NOTE:
assignment of authority to activate the halon / CO2 system should be
clearly delineated in the
command's fire doctrine.
g)
Secure ventilation or set negative ventilation in the adjacent spaces.
h)
Inform all engineering spaces of the situation.
i)
Set fire boundaries
j)
Ensure adequate fire main pressure.
k)
Establish communications with repair five.
l)
Maintain unaffected areas of the plant in
operation.
m)
If possible, if the fire is reported out of control inform the OOD and
all engineering spaces, secure and isolate the affected space.
NOTE: isolation procedures and priorities should
be delineated in the command fire
doctrine.
n)
Direct repair five to enter the space and fight the fire.
NOTE:
Control of the fire fighting evolution will pass to the DCA during general quarters. In the event this casualty should occur in Main Control, the procedures for shifting
control of the engineering spaces (Alternate
Main Control) should be implemented and delineated in the Command Fire Doctrine.
3.
Supplementary Actions: Secure
Plant IAW EOP.
4.
Restoring Actions:
a)
Formally return control of the affected space to the EOOW.
b)
Repair damage as necessary.
c)
Place space in operation IAW EOP.
S.
Fire in
Boiler Air Casing (FBAC)
1.
Symptoms /Indications:
a)
Boiler casing getting hot around lower portion.
b)
Visual inspection through burner and furnace sight glasses reveals fire
in casing.
2.
Causes: Accumulation of oil in
air casing double front caused by:
a)
Partially clogged atomizers.
b)
Burner barrels left installed after fires are secured (leaking into
burner jacket tubes).
c)
Excessive deposits of carbon on registers or furnace throat rings
(Improper Tip Nut -to- Diffuser settings).
d)
Plugged drain holes or improperly adjusted atomizers
e)
Boiler explosion.
3.
Possible Effects:
a)
Warped or burned out casing.
b)
Loss of boiler and steam pressure.
4.
Controlling Actions: None.
5.
Immediate Actions:
a)
Trip fuel oil quick closing valve.
b)
BTOW order No. boiler secured
and report to EOOW, "Fire in boiler air casing. Securing No.
boiler" Ensure the following steps are performed:
c)
Stop fuel oil service pump.
d)
Trip accumulator fuel oil quick closing valve
e)
Shut burner safety shutoff device.
f)
Crack open fuel oil supply manifold
recirculating valve.
g)
Shift combustion control from automatic to remote manual one knob
control and adjust minimum.
h)
Trip main feed pumps.
i)
Shut burner fuel oil supply and steam
atomizing manifold valves.
j)
Stop forced draft blowers.
k)
Open No. boiler air casing
steam smothering valves.
l)
Shut boiler main steam stop valve.
m)
Shift main feed pump(s) control from automatic to remote manual and
adjust to minimum.
n)
Shift feedwater control from automatic to remote manual and adjust to
minimum.
o)
Ensure boiler main steam stop is secured.
p)
Visually verify fires are secured.
q)
Shut all air registers (If residual fire is present, leave No. air register open and allow fire to burn
out).
6.
Supplementary Actions:
a)
1S switchboard operator monitor report to EOOW, "Diesel generator
with ships load of AMPS and KW".
b)
Shut designated reserve and emergency feedwater tank makeup feed valve.
c)
Secure distilling plant/s.
d)
Silence all alarms.
e)
Shift combustion control from remote manual one knob control to remote
manual and adjust to minimum.
f)
Shut feedwater stop-check valve.
g)
Stop main feed pump(s).
h)
Investigate cause of casualty; check the following:
(1)
Boiler inner casing drip pan.
(2)
Burner drain holes.
(3)
Burner assemblies.
(4)
Inspect boiler air casing for damage (360 0 inspection).
i)
When BTOW reports to EOOW, cause of casualty
and estimated time to repair, EOOW report to OOD, cause of casualty and
estimated time to repair.
7.
Restore Casualty:
a)
When the Engineer Officer determines the casualty has not affected the
plant equipment and it is immediately restorable, restore the plant in
accordance with EOP procedures.
b)
When the casualty is not immediately restorable, continue to secure the
affected boiler. Light off unaffected
boiler and restore plant using EOP procedures.
T.
Low Water
in Deaerating Feed Tank
1.
SYMPTOMS / INDICATIONS:
a)
Main feed booster low discharge pressure alarm sounds.
b)
Water level is out of sight in DFT gauge glasses and remote level
indicator indicates low.
c)
Main feed booster pump loses suction.
d)
Main feed booster pump binds or seizes.
e)
Main feed pump trips off the line.
f)
Loss of main feed pressure to boiler.
2.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
a)
Makeup feed misaligned.
b)
High DFT shell pressure.
c)
Condensate recirculating system is misaligned.
d)
Failure or malfunction of operating condensate pump.
e)
Failure of freshwater drain tank pump.
3.
Possible Effects:
a)
Damage to main feed booster and/or main feed pump.
b)
Loss of main feed pressure resulting in low water in steaming boiler/s.
4.
Controlling Actions:
a)
BTOW report to EOOW, "Experiencing difficulty maintaining DFT water
level; water level dropping".
b)
EOOW notify all main engineering spaces of impending casualty.
c)
EOOW report to OOD, "Losing water level in DFT".
d)
When water level in DFT drops below 800 gallons and time permits,
proceed as follows:
(1)
Check condensate pump for proper operation and alignment.
(2)
Check condensate system for proper alignment.
(3)
Check auxiliary exhaust unloading valve for proper operation.
(4)
Check main condenser hotwell level.
CAUTION: Open standby condensate pump discharge valve
slowly to prevent consequential
quenching and flashing of the DFT.
e)
If hotwell level is high, start standby condensate pump.
CAUTION:
When DFT water level drops to bottom of gage glass and/or is uncontrollable, proceed to "Immediate Actions".
f)
Monitor DFT water level.
g)
Monitor DFT shell pressure.
h)
Check water level in freshwater drain tank.
WARNING: Do not fill DFT rapidly with cold feedwater
when DFT is hot.
i)
If required, BTOW order, "Standby
freshwater drain tank pump started discharging to main condensate system".
j)
BTOW report to EOOW, No. DFT water level normal.
5.
Immediate Actions:
CAUTION:
when the water in the DFT is at the bottom of the gauge glass and/or is uncontrollable, secure the boiler/s.
a)
BTOW order No. boiler secured
and report to EOOW, "Low water in DFT; securing No. boiler".
b)
EOOW notify all main engineering spaces of casualty.
c)
EOOW report to OOD, "Low water in DFT".
6.
Supplementary Actions:
a)
1S switchboard operator monitor report to EOOW, "Diesel generator
with ships load of AMPS and KW.
b)
Shut designated reserve and emergency feedwater tank makeup feed valve.
c)
Secure distilling plant/s.
d)
Silence all alarms.
e)
Shift combustion control from remote manual one knob control to remote
manual and adjust to minimum.
f)
Shut feedwater stop-check valve.
g)
Stop forced draft blower/s.
h)
Stop main feed pump/s.
i)
Investigate cause of casualty; check the
following:
(1)
DFT shell pressure.
(2)
Exhaust pressure.
(3)
High-pressure drains.
(4)
Condensate alignment.
(5)
Failure of freshwater drain tank pump.
j)
When BTOW / MMOW reports to EOOW, cause of
casualty and estimated time to repair, EOOW report to OOD, cause of casualty
and estimated time to repair.
7.
Restore Casualty:
a)
When the Engineer Officer determines the casualty has not affected the
plant equipment and it is immediately restorable, restore the plant in
accordance with EOP procedures.
b)
When the casualty is not immediately restorable, continue to secure the
affected boiler. Lightoff the
unaffected boiler and restore the plant using EOP procedures.
U.
Ruptured
Deaerating Feed Tank or Feed Piping
1.
Symptoms / Indications
a)
Steam and water emitting from feed piping or DFT.
b)
Water level drops out of sight in DFT gauge glasses and remote level
indicator indicates low.
c)
Deaerating feed tank shell pressure decreases.
d)
Main feed booster low discharge pressure alarm sounds.
e)
Main feed booster pump loses suction.
f)
Loss of feed booster pump discharge
pressure.
g)
Main feed pump trips off the line.
h)
Loss of main feed pressure to boiler.
2.
Possible Causes:
a)
High DFT shell pressure.
b)
Filling hot DFT with cold water.
c)
Failure of vacuum breaker on DFT.
d)
Feed piping split or carried away.
3.
Possible Effects:
a)
Space fills with steam requiring evacuation of space personnel.
b)
Loss of main feed pressure resulting in low water in steaming boiler/s
c)
Damage to main feed booster and/or main feed pump/s.
4.
Controlling Actions: None.
5.
Immediate Actions:
WARNING: Rupturing the DFT or feed piping may require
evacuation of space personnel. When required, proceed to major steam
leak/rupture casualty.
a)
BTOW order No. boiler secured
and report to EOOW, "Ruptured DFT/feed piping; securing No. boiler".
b)
When possible, cover electrical components.
c)
EOOW notify all main engineering spaces of casualty.
d)
EOOW report to OOD, "Ruptured DFT/feed piping in fireroom.
6.
Supplementary Actions:
a)
1S switchboard operator monitor report to EOOW, "Diesel generator
with ships load of AMPS and KW.
b)
Shut designated reserve and emergency feedwater tank makeup feed valve.
c)
Secure distilling plant/s.
d)
Silence all alarms.
e)
Shift combustion control from remote manual one knob control to remote
manual and adjust to minimum.
f)
Shut feedwater stop-check valve.
g)
Stop forced draft blower/s.
h)
Stop main feed pump/s.
i)
When BTOW reports to EOOW, cause of casualty
and estimated time to repair, EOOW report to OOD, cause of casualty and
estimated time to repair.
7.
Restore Casualty:
a)
This casualty is not immediately restorable. Continue to secure the fireroom.
Secure main engine and auxiliary plant in accordance with EOP.
b)
When repairs are made at sea, light off boiler and restore main engine
and auxiliary equipment using EOP procedures.
c)
When repairs were effected but was not immediately restorable, restore
the boiler, maine engine and auxiliary plant in accordance with EOP.
V.
Major Steam
Leak /Rupture in Propulsion Plant
1.
Symptoms / Indications: Steam
escaping from component or piping.
2.
Possible Causes:
a)
Pressure boundary failure.
b)
Improper setting of pipe hangers.
c)
Improper warmup procedures.
d)
Incorrect isolation of pressurized lines and inadequate tag out
procedures incident to repairs and/or maintenance.
3.
Possible Effects:
a)
Loss of vital equipment or supplies.
b)
Machinery space fills with steam.
c)
Heat, lack of oxygen and noise hazard to personnel.
4.
Controlling Actions: None.
5.
Immediate Actions:
NOTE: When a major steam leak/rupture occurs,
personnel should attempt, as time permits
to locate and isolate rupture and secure equipment, including stopping and locking shaft and securing the
boiler. Place effected space exhaust ventilation on high and supply on low
speed. Adjacent spaces place supply ventilation
on high and exhaust on low. If
immediate evacuation is required, personnel
must don emergency escape breathing device (EEBD) and immediately evacuate space and report to repair 5 for
muster. Securing of equipment should be accomplished from
remote operating stations with assistance
of repair 5.
a)
Attempt to locate/isolate leak.
b)
Space supervisor report to EOOW, Major steam/rupture in
engineroom/fireroom, port/starboard side, upper/lower level".
c)
When required, evacuate affected space, secure equipment, isolate
affected space and muster watch section with repair 5.
d)
Place affected space exhaust ventilation on high speed.
e)
Secure affected plant.
f)
BTOW order boiler secured.
6.
Supplementary Actions:
a)
Man unaffected switchboard and establish communications between
switchboard operators.
b)
Monitor electrical load. If
electrical load is greater than ship service diesel generator capacity, reduce
the load as follows then report to EOOW.
c)
Open circuit breakers on switchboard as required to control overload.
d)
Adjust voltage and frequency on ship service diesel generator to
compensate for load increase, maintain 450 volts, 60 hertz.
e)
Switchboard operator report to EOOW, "Ship service diesel generator
with ships load of AMPS and KW.
f)
Shut auxiliary exhaust inlet valve to main
condenser.
g)
Shut steam supply valve to main engine gland seal regulator.
h)
Shut main air ejector condenser condensate discharge valve.
i)
Shift main condenser recirculation from low
to high.
j)
Shut steam supply valve to main air ejector.
k)
Shut main engine ahead and astern guarding valves and drain main steam
lines.
l)
Align main engine turbine drains for
securing .
m)
When shaft comes to a complete stop and steam chest pressure is zero (0)
PSI, engage jacking gear using EOP.
n)
Ensure the following auxiliary equipment is in operation:
(1)
Main condenser circulating water pump.
(2)
Main condensate pump.
(3)
Fire and flushing pump.
(4)
Silence all alarms.
(5)
Shift combustion control from automatic to remote manual and adjust to
minimum.
(6)
Shut feedwater stop-check valve.
(7)
Stop forced draft blower/s.
(8)
Verify equipment status.
(9)
Verify valve status.
7.
Restore Casualty: This casualty
is not immediately restorable. Continue
to secure the affected compartment in accordance with EOP procedures (if
possible). Engineer Officer determine
equipment to be restarted.